Thinking Two Moves Ahead: Anticipating Other Users Improves Backdoor Attacks in Federated Learning

Yuxin Wen ¹  Jonas Geiping ¹  Liam Fowl ¹  Hossein Souri ²  Rama Chellappa ²  Micah Goldblum ³  Tom Goldstein ¹

Abstract

Federated learning is particularly susceptible to model poisoning and backdoor attacks because individual users have direct control over the training data and model updates. At the same time, the attack power of an individual user is limited because their updates are quickly drowned out by those of many other users. Existing attacks do not account for future behaviors of other users, and thus require many sequential updates and their effects are quickly erased. We propose an attack that anticipates and accounts for the entire federated learning pipeline, including behaviors of other clients, and ensures that backdoors are effective quickly and persist even after multiple rounds of community updates. We show that this new attack is effective in realistic scenarios where the attacker only contributes to a small fraction of randomly sampled rounds and demonstrate this attack on image classification, next-word prediction, and sentiment analysis.

1. Introduction

When training models on private information, it is desirable to choose a learning paradigm that does not require stockpiling user data in a central location. Federated learning (Konečný et al., 2015; McMahan et al., 2017b) achieves this goal by offloading the work of model training and storage to remote devices that do not directly share data with the central server. Each user device instead receives the current state of the model from the central server, computes local updates based on user data, and then returns only the updated model to the server.

Unfortunately, by placing responsibility for model updates in the handle of many anonymous users, federated learning also opens up model training to a range of malicious attacks (Bagdasaryan et al., 2019; Kairouz et al., 2021). In model poisoning attacks (Biggio & Roli, 2018; Bhagoji et al., 2019), a user sends malicious updates to the central server to alter behavior of the model. For example in language modeling, backdoor attacks could modify the behavior of the final model to misrepresent specific facts, attach negative sentiment to certain groups, change behavior in edge cases, but also attach false advertising and spam to certain key phrases.

In practical applications, however, the real threat posed by such attacks is debated (Sun et al., 2019b; Wang et al., 2020; Shejwalkar et al., 2021). Usually only a small fraction of users are presumed to be malicious, and their impact on the final model can be small, especially when the contributions of each user are limited by norm-bounding (Sun et al., 2019b). Attacks as described in Bagdasaryan & Shmatikov (2021) further require successive attacks over numerous sequential rounds of training. This is not realistic in normal cross-device applications (Bonawitz et al., 2019; Hard et al., 2019) where users are randomly selected in each round from a larger pool, making it exceedingly unlikely that any attacker or even group of attackers will be able to contribute to more than a fraction of the total rounds of training. Model updates that are limited in this way are immediately less effective, as even strong backdoor attacks can be wiped away and replaced by subsequent updates from many benign users Sun et al. (2019b); Shejwalkar et al. (2021).

In this work we set out to discover whether strong attacks are possible in these more realistic scenarios. We make the key observation that previous attack algorithms such as described in Bagdasaryan et al. (2019); Wang et al. (2020); Zhou et al. (2021) only consider the immediate effects of a model update, and ignore the downstream impacts of updates from benign users. We show that, by modeling these future updates, a savvy attacker can update model parameters in a way that is unlikely to be over-written or undone by benign users. By backpropagating through simulated future updates, our proposed attack directly optimizes a malicious update to maximize its permanence. Using both vision and

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Figure 1. Our method, Anticipate, reaches 100% backdoor accuracy faster than the baseline in the setting of 100 random attacks in the first 500 rounds. Moreover, after the window of attack passes, the attack decays much slower than the baseline. At the end of federated training, our attack still has backdoor accuracy of 50%, while the baseline maintains just 10%. Overall, only 100 out of a total of 20k contributions are malicious.

language tasks, and under a realistic threat model where attack opportunities are rare, we see that these novel attacks become operational after fewer attack opportunities than baseline methods, and remain active for much longer after the attack has passed. As shown in Figure 1, these novel backdoors are both operational after fewer attack opportunities than baseline attacks and fall off much slower after the window of attack has passed.

2. Background

Federated Learning systems have been described in a series of studies and a variety of protocols. In this work, we focus on mainly on federated averaging (fedAVG) as proposed in McMahan et al. (2017b) and implemented in a range of recent system designs (Bonawitz et al., 2019; Paulik et al., 2021; Dimitriadis et al., 2022), but the attack we describe can be extended to other algorithms. In fedAVG, the server sends the current state of the model $\theta_i$ to all users selected for the next round of training. Each user then computed an updated local model through several iterations, for example via local SGD. The $u$-th local user has data $D_u$ which is partitioned into batches $D_u$ and then, starting from the global model, their local model is updated for $m$ steps based on the training objective $\mathcal{L}$:

$$\theta_{i+1,u} = \theta_{i,u} - \tau \nabla \mathcal{L}(D_u, \theta_{i,u}).$$

(1)

The updated models $\theta_{i+1,u}$ from each user are returned to the server which computes a new central state by averaging:

$$\theta_{i+1} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{u=1}^{n} \theta_{i+1,u}.$$  

(2)

We will later summarize this procedure that depends on a group of users $U_i$ in the $i$-th round as $\theta_{i+1} = F_{\text{avg}}(U_i, \theta_i)$.

Optionally, the average can be reweighted based on the amount of data controlled by each user (Bonawitz et al., 2017), however this is unsafe without further precautions, as an attacker could overweight their own contributions such that we only consider unweighted averages in this work. Federated Averaging is further safeguarded against malicious users by the use of norm-bounding. Each updated model $\theta_{i,u}$ is projected onto an $||\theta_{i,u}||_p \leq C$, for some clip value $C$ so that no user update can dominate the average.

Norm-bounding is necessary to defend against model replacement attacks described in Bagdasaryan et al. (2019) and Bhagoji et al. (2019) which send malicious updates with extreme magnitudes that overpower updates from benign users. Once norm-bounding is in place as a defense though, the potential threat posed by malicious attacks remains debated. We summarize a few related areas of research, before returning to this question:

Adversarial Machine Learning The attacks investigated in this paper are a special case of train-time adversarial attacks against machine learning systems (Biggio et al., 2012; Cinà et al., 2022). The federated learning scenario is naturally an online, white-box scenario. The attack happens online, while the model is training, and can adapt to the current state of training. The attack is also white-box as all users have knowledge of model architecture and local training hyperparameters.

Train-time Attacks In this work we are further interest in backdoor attacks, also referred to as targeted attacks, which form a subset of model integrity attacks (Barreno et al., 2010). These attacks generally attempt to incorporate malicious behavior into a model without modifying its apparent performance on test data. In the simplest case, malicious behavior could be an image classification model that misclassifies images marked with a special patch. These attacks are in contrast to model availability attacks which aim to undermine model performance on all hold-out data. Availability attacks are generally considered infeasible in large-
scale federated learning systems when norm-bounding is employed (Shejwalkar et al., 2021), given that malicious users likely form only a minority of all users.

**Data Poisoning** The model poisoning attacks described above are closely related to data poisoning attacks against centralized training (Goldblum et al., 2020). There, the training data is poisoned before it is sent to the centralized server. These attacks are thought to scale to larger numbers of (unwilling) participants, given that distribution of data is easier than the setup of fully malicious devices (Shejwalkar et al., 2021), but are also far more constrained compared to model poisoning which can modify all parameters in the model returned to the server instead of just the input. The idea of anticipating future updates has been investigated in some works on data poisoning (Muñoz-González et al., 2017; Huang et al., 2020) where it arises as approximation of the bilevel data poisoning objective. These attacks optimize a set of poisoned datapoints by differentiating through several steps of the expected SGD update that the central server would perform on this data. However, for data poisoning, the attacker is unaware of the model state used by the server, cannot optimize their attack for each round of training, and has only approximate knowledge of model architecture and hyperparameters. This complications lead Huang et al. (2020) to construct a large ensemble of model states trained to different stages to approximate missing knowledge.

3. Can you Backdoor Federated Learning?

Backdoor attacks against federated learning have been described in Bagdasaryan et al. (2019). The attacker uses local data and their malicious objective to create their own replacement model, scales this replacement model to the largest scale allowed by the server’s norm-bounding rule and sends it. However, as discussed in Sun et al. (2019b), for a more realistic number of malicious users and randomly occurring attacks, backdoor success is much smaller, especially against stringent norm-bounding. Wang et al. (2020) note that backdoor success is high in edge cases not seen in training and that backdoors that attack “rare” samples (such as only airplanes in a specific color in images, or a specific sentence in text) can be much more successful, as other users do not influence these predictions significantly. A number of variants of this attack exist (Costa et al., 2021; Pang et al., 2021; Fang et al., 2020; Baruch et al., 2019; Xie et al., 2019; Datta et al., 2021; Yoo & Kwak, 2022; Zhang et al., 2019; Sun et al., 2022), for example allowing for collusion between multiple users or generating additional data for the attacker. In this work we will focus broadly on the threat model of Bagdasaryan et al. (2019); Wang et al. (2020).

**Threat Model** We assume a federated learning protocol running with multiple users, attacked by online white-box model poisoning. The server orchestrates federated averaging with norm-bounding. The attacker is a single user and only has knowledge about the local data from this user. The attacker has full control over the model update that will be returned to the server and can optimize this model freely. As a participating user in FL, the attacker is also aware of the number of local steps and local learning rate that users are expected to use. We will discuss two variations of this threat model with different attack opportunities. 1) The attacker is chosen every round during a limited time window as in Bagdasaryan et al. (2019). 2) The attacker is chosen only for random rounds during a limited time window as discussed in Sun et al. (2019b).

We believe this threat model with random attack opportunities is a natural step towards the evaluation of risks caused by backdoor attacks in more realistic systems. We do restrict the defense to only norm-bounding and explore worst-case attacks against this scenario. As argued in Sun et al. (2019b), norm-bounding is thought to be sufficient to prevent these attacks, although we acknowledge that other defenses exist, see overviews in Wang et al. (2022) and Qiu et al. (2022).

We focus on norm bounding because it is a standard defense that is widely used in industrial implementations of federated learning (Bonawitz et al., 2019; Paulik et al., 2021; Dimitriadis et al., 2022).

4. Attacks with End-to-End Optimization

4.1. Baseline

As described by Gu et al. (2017); Bagdasaryan et al. (2019), suppose an attacker holds $N$ clean data points, $D_c = \{x^c_i, y^c_i\}_{i=1}^N$, and $M$ backdoored data points, $D_b = \{x^b_i, y^b_i\}_{i=1}^M$, where $x^c_i$ could be an input with a special patch or edge-case example (Wang et al., 2020), and $y^b$ is an attacker-chosen prediction. The goal of the attacker is to train a malicious model that predicts $y^b$ when it sees a backdoored input, and to push this behavior to the central model. The attacker can optimize their malicious objective $L_{adv}$ directly to identify backdoored parameters:

$$\theta^* = \arg\min_{\theta} L_{adv}(D_b, \theta)$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

where $L_{adv}$ is the loss function of the task, $\theta$ are the weights of the local model. Some attacks such as Bhagoji et al. (2019) also include an additional term that enforces that model performance on local clean data remains good, when measured by the original objective $L$:

$$\theta^* = \arg\min_{\theta} L_{adv}(D_b, \theta) + L(D_c, \theta).$$

The update is then scaled to the maximal value allowed by norm-bounding and sent to the server.
4.2. Anticipating Other Users

This baseline attack can be understood as a greedy objective which optimizes the effect of the backdoor only for the current stage of training and assumes that the impact of other users is negligible after scaling. We show that a stronger attack anticipates and involves the benign users’ contributions in current and several future rounds during the backdoor optimization. The optimal malicious update sent by the attacker should be chosen so that it is optimal even if the update is averaged with the contributions of other users and then used for several further rounds of training to which the attacker has no access. We pose this criteria as a loss function to be optimized. Intuitively, this allows the attack to optimally select which parts of the model update to modify, and to estimate and avoid which parts would be overwritten by other users.

Formally, with \( n \) users per round, suppose an attacker wants to anticipate \( k \) steps (in the following we will use this keyword to denote the whole attack pipeline). Then, given the current local model, \( \theta_0 \), the objective of the attacker is simply to compute the adversarial objective in Equation (3), but optimize it not directly for \( \theta \), but instead insert \( \theta_k \) which depends implicitly on the attacker’s contribution. To make this precise, we move through all steps now. Denote the model update that the attacker contributes by \( \theta_{\text{mal}} \). In the next round following this contribution, the other users \( U_0 \) will themselves contribute updates \( \theta_{b,i,u} \). Both are averaged and result in

\[
\theta_i = \frac{\theta_{\text{mal}} + \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \theta_{b,j}}{n},
\]

where \( \theta_i \) now depends on \( \theta_{\text{mal}} \). Then, \( k - 1 \) more rounds follow in which the attacker does not contribute, but where new users \( U_i \) contribute:

\[
\theta_{i+1} = F_{\text{avg}}(U_i, \theta_i).
\]

Finally, \( \theta^k \) still depends implicitly on the malicious contribution \( \theta_{\text{mal}} \). As such, an omniscient attacker could then optimize

\[
\theta^* = \arg\min_{\theta_{\text{mal}}} \mathcal{L}_{\text{adv}}(D_0, \theta_k(\theta_{\text{mal}})) + \mathcal{L}(D_c, \theta_k(\theta_{\text{mal}})),
\]

(4)

differentiating the resulting graph of \( \mathcal{L}_{\text{adv}} \) with respect to \( \theta_{\text{mal}} \) and compute the gradient direction in which \( \theta_{\text{mal}} \) should be updated to improve the effect of the backdoor.

Algorithm 1: Anticipate Algorithm

1: **Input**: Global model \( \theta_0 \), batch size \( b \), number of modeled users per round \( n' \), future updates anticipated: \( k \), update steps \( n' \), the attacker \( A \) owns a set of clean data \( D_c \) and backdoor data \( D_b \).
2: \( \theta_{\text{mal}} = \text{Initialize from } \theta_0 \)
3: for \( 0, \ldots, n' - 1 \) do
4:   for \( i = 0, \ldots, k - 1 \) do
5:     Model a group of users \( U_i \):
6:       for \( u = 0, \ldots, n' - 1 \) do
7:         \( U_{i,u} = \text{Sample } b \text{ data points from } D_c \)
8:       end for
9:     Run one round of federated averaging:
10:       if \( i == 0 \) then
11:         \( \theta_{i+1} = F_{\text{avg}}(A(\theta_{\text{mal}}) \cup U_i, \theta_i) \)
12:       else
13:         \( \theta_{i+1} = F_{\text{avg}}(U_i, \theta_i) \)
14:       end if
15:   end for
16:   Differentiate the \( k - t \) step w.r.t to \( \theta_{\text{mal}} \):
17:     \( g_{\theta_{\text{mal}}} = \nabla_{\theta_{\text{mal}}} [\mathcal{L}_{\text{adv}}(D_b, \theta_k) + \mathcal{L}(D_c, \theta_k)] \)
18:   Update \( \theta_{\text{mal}} \) based on \( g_{\theta_{\text{mal}}} \)
19: end for
20: return \( \theta_{\text{mal}} \)

However, in practice, this optimization problem is intractable. First, the attacker is unaware of the exact private data of other users in future rounds. Meanwhile, involving the full group of all users \( U_t \) in the intermediate federated learning round makes the problem unsolvable for limited compute resources, given that each call to \( F_{\text{avg}} \) contains many local update steps for each user which each depend on \( \theta_{\text{mal}} \). Therefore, we stochastically sample the full optimization problem: First, we decide to model only a subset of users \( n' < n \) and then randomly sample a single batch of data for each local update in each round, from the attackers own data source \( D_c \). Based on this data, the attacker can then recompute the local update steps for this limited group of users and in this way stochastically approximate the real contributions from other users with a replaced average over only the subset of modeled users. Over multiple steps \( m' \) over which the attacker optimizes the malicious update \( \theta_{\text{mal}} \), random data is sampled in every step. We summarize all steps in Algorithm 1. Although the estimation of the adversarial gradient is randomized and based on the distribution of the attacker’s data, we find that this scheme is able to reliably generate malicious updates that lead to robust backdoors.

5. Experiments

In this section, we thoroughly analyze our attack on three different datasets: CIFAR-10 (image classification) (Krizhevsky et al., 2009), Reddit (next-word prediction)
(Caldas et al., 2018), and Sentiment140 (sentiment analysis) (Go et al., 2009). The Reddit dataset naturally contains non-IID partitions. For CIFAR-10 we include results for both IID and non-IID partitions of the dataset. Overall, we show that the proposed method does outperform the baseline of Bagdasaryan et al. (2019) under all tasks and scenarios.

5.1. Experimentation Details

As described, our experiments implement fedAVG (McMahan et al., 2017a; Wang et al., 2021) with norm-bounding (Sun et al., 2019a). We implement the implicit objective defined in Equation (4) using funtchorch (He & Zou, 2021). For each \( \theta_{i,j} \), we sample data points from private clean data randomly. For example, for CIFAR-10 and a batch size of 64, this still allows us to fit \( k = 5 \) steps with 10 modeled users onto 11GB of GPU memory. Note that the number of actual users is significantly larger.

For all three datasets, we follow the overall settings discussed in Bagdasaryan et al. (2019); Wang et al. (2020; 2021). We also randomly split CIFAR-10 over users to make an IID CIFAR-10 task. Details of how each dataset is processed are described below:

**CIFAR-10:** For CIFAR-10 we investigate an IID partition of data to users and the non-IID split computed through Dirichlet sampling with \( \alpha = 1 \) (Hsu et al., 2019) both with total 100 users. For both CIFAR-10 partitions, we choose the backdoor pattern trigger from Gu et al. (2017). The attacker can hence overlay the backdoor pattern on clean data inputs to generate backdoored inputs \( D_b \). We choose the label 8 (ship) as the target class for all experiments. For fair comparisons to prior work (Bagdasaryan et al., 2019), we also choose ResNet18 (He et al., 2016). However, it is unclear how to realistically implement norm-bounding for the running stats of Batch Normalization, and global batch norm would typically not be available in a federated system (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015; Li et al., 2021). Therefore, following Wang et al. (2021), we replace Batch Normalization with Group Normalization with \( G = 32 \) (Wu & He, 2018). Empirically, we choose to anticipate \( k = 5 \) training steps.

**Reddit:** For the Reddit dataset, we take a subset of 2000 users. For next-word prediction, an attacker wants to provide a target word recommendation for users following a trigger sentence. We return to the trigger and target evaluated in Bagdasaryan et al. (2019); the attacker backdoors data by appending pasta from Astoria is to the end of a sentence, and the target is to predict the next word delicious. Following Bagdasaryan et al. (2019), the adversarial loss on the model output is only computed based on the last word, is, of the autoregressive loss. We re-use the modified 3-layer Transformer model discussed for FL in Wang et al. (2021). We again anticipate \( k = 3 \) steps.

**Sentiment140:** In Sentiment140 experiments, there are 1000 users in total, and we consider the edge-case examples from Wang et al. (2020) as backdoored data. For example, positive tweets containing Yorgos Lanthimos are labeled as negative tweets. For this dataset, we adopt the smaller 3-layer Transformer as above (Vaswani et al., 2017), where the hidden dimension is 1024, and we anticipate \( k = 2 \) steps.

5.2. Metrics

An attacker’s goal is to ensure that the backdoor attack accuracy is as high as possible for the global model at the final stage. In real scenarios, the number of rounds in which the attacker will be queried by the server and the total number of rounds are unknown to the attacker. For that reason, an attacker wants the attack to be easily implanted and to remain functional as long as possible. Therefore, to test the efficiency of the method, we track the average backdoor accuracy after the first attack (\( \alpha_{\text{first}} \)) and the average backdoor accuracy after the last attack (\( \alpha_{\text{last}} \)).

5.3. Sequential Rounds

We first verify that the proposed attack is always an improvement over Bagdasaryan et al. (2019) in the simple setting in which the attacker is queried in all rounds (Wang et al., 2020). We consider 30, 50, and 100 rounds for CIFAR-10, Reddit, and Sentiment140 respectively. These numbers are chosen so that the baseline of Bagdasaryan et al. (2019) can reach a peak backdoor accuracy of at least 95%. For each task, we then repeat the experiment with 5 random seeds and show the plot of the first random seed (to avoid cherry-picking) in Figure 2. We see form these curves that the proposed anticipate strategy reaches a peak accuracy slightly faster than the baseline. Especially for the two NLP tasks, when anticipate reaches full backdoor accuracy, the baseline’s backdoor accuracy is still below 50%. After the last attack, anticipate still (slightly) outperforms the baseline across all tasks. In addition, we report average \( \alpha_{\text{first}} \) and average \( \alpha_{\text{last}} \) of five runs for every experiment in Table 1. Note that in this simple setting the attacker can modify every step of FedAvg, and so there is little risk of adversarial updates fading away. In the next section, we will evaluate the baseline and proposed attacks in the more real-world settings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Task 1</th>
<th>Task 2</th>
<th>Task 3</th>
<th>Task 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \alpha_{\text{first}} ) baseline</td>
<td>64.72</td>
<td>69.72</td>
<td>12.22</td>
<td>31.87</td>
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<tr>
<td>ours</td>
<td>67.27</td>
<td>75.09</td>
<td>29.38</td>
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<td>( \alpha_{\text{last}} ) baseline</td>
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<td>70.99</td>
<td>11.25</td>
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<td>ours</td>
<td>68.04</td>
<td>77.82</td>
<td>27.82</td>
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</table>
5.4. Random Rounds

In a real federated learning scenario, it is rare that an attacker is selected for a large number of consecutive rounds, and we will now switch to the more challenging but realistic scenario of random selections. In such scenario, an attacker is randomly selected by the server and does not have any knowledge of the next selected round. This means sometimes there might be a larger time gap between two consecutive attacks. For a fair comparison, we randomly select 100 rounds for CIFAR-10, 50 rounds for Reddit, and 100 rounds for Sentiment140 from the first 500 rounds of the whole federated learning routine (to simulate a limited time window for the attack). Overall, these 100/50/100 malicious updates are only a small fraction of the 5000 overall updates contributed to the model within the time window of the attack, and an even smaller fraction when compared to 20000 total contributions over the entire 2000 rounds of training. As above, we choose these numbers to yield some success for the baseline attack. Figure 3 shows the plots of each experiment (again from the first random seed). Compared to the experiments of sequential rounds, these more realistic evaluations show that the proposed anticipate strategy is significantly more effective than the baseline attack at attacking the central model. For example, for the non-IID CIFAR-10 experiment, the baseline only maintains a backdoor accuracy of 12% after the attack window, yet anticipate maintains backdoor accuracy around 50%. We again include quantitative results in Table 2, computing average $a_{\text{first}}$ and average $a_{\text{last}}$ over the 5 runs of each task.

Table 2. Quantitative results for random rounds attack. We report average $a_{\text{first}}$ and average $a_{\text{last}}$ of five runs for every experiment. Task 1, task 2, task 3, and task 4 refer to non-IID CIFAR-10, IID CIFAR-10, Reddit, and Sentiment140.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Task 1</th>
<th>Task 2</th>
<th>Task 3</th>
<th>Task 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>59.41</td>
<td>10.97</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ours</td>
<td>73.75</td>
<td>80.61</td>
<td>31.26</td>
<td>29.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Conclusion

The goal of this work is to evaluate the feasibility of backdoor attacks in the realistic regime where users are numerous and not consistently queried by the central server. We do this by considering an attack that models simulated FedAvg updates and choose adversarial perturbations that are unlikely to be over-written by other users. Through a series of experiments on backdoor attacks for image classification, next-word prediction, and sentiment analysis, we show that this strategy can lead to strong performance of backdoor attacks, even in scenarios where the attacker has relatively few opportunities to influence the model.

7. Acknowledgements

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References


A. Hyperparameter Study: Number of Steps

A central hyperparameter to the attack is the amount of steps to anticipate (and subsequently to evaluate the objective on). In Figure 4, we compare anticipation intervals between 2 and 10 on the random rounds attack for non-IID CIFAR-10. We find that the larger the number of steps an attacker employs, the faster the attack is implanted. However, interestingly, such quick implantation does not necessarily mean that the attack lasts longer. The highest accuracy at the end of training is actually reached at \( k = 6 \) steps. However, any number of steps improves over the greedy baseline attack which corresponds to \( k = 0 \).

![Figure 4. Backdoor accuracy among different Anticipate steps. Simulating up to 10 Anticipate steps improves the backdoor persistence.](image)

B. Ablation Study: Amount of Private Data

The number of private data points an attacker holds is critical for how well the attacker can estimate the benign user’s contribution. Intuitively, the more private data an attacker holds the more accurately the attacker can predict other users. To estimate the effect of data on the attack, we test variations where the attacker holds 100, 300, 500, and 700 data points for non-IID CIFAR-10, and show backdoor evaluations in Figure 5. In this case, all other benign users have 500 images. For the experiment with data size = 0 in the figure, the attacker replaces the data for other users with random noise, using their own 500 images only to create \( D_b \). We find that more data does robustify backdoor performance, and that random data is insufficient to model other users. However, even with only 100 data points, the estimation is notably successful.

![Figure 5. Backdoor accuracy with different amounts of private data held by the attacker. Even a limited amount of local data available to the attacker is sufficient for a strong attack.](image)
C. Ablation Study: Number of Users Per Round

Another important factor in federated learning is the number of users involved in each round. The aggregation between a larger number of users might be more difficult for implanting the attack. Again, we test 5 cases with 5, 10, 15, 20, and 30 users per round for non-IID CIFAR-10. Figure 6 shows how effective the attack is in different situations. For the case with less than 20 users, the attack is still effective with 100 random rounds attack in the first 500 rounds. However, when there are more than 20 users, the attack still needs more rounds to work.

![Figure 6. Backdoor accuracy with different numbers of users per round. The effectiveness of the attack decreases as the number of users per round increases.](image)

D. Analysis

Why does this strategy improve backdoor effectiveness? We investigate this by stopping the simulated FL protocol for the CIFAR-10 task and for a fixed round of attack, computing both the baseline attack and the proposed attack updates. We visualize the cosine similarities between the benign update directions and both attack variants in Figure 7. Interestingly, the gradient updates of the proposed attack are almost orthogonal (cos similarity = 0.04) to the benign user’s gradient update. In contrast, the cosine similarity between the baseline’s update and the benign user’s update is larger (0.3). Only when the gradient update of the proposed anticipate attack is averaged with the benign users’ updates does the resulting update bare similarity to the baseline update. We hypothesize that the attack is more successful because it takes into account the direction of benign users’ contributions, and does not optimize updates that are too aligned with certain directions that may be “cancelled” out by other updates and doesn’t overly focus on parameters in the model that are already updated by benign users. This also explains why the injection of the attack is faster than the baseline that does not consider any other users’ update directions.

![Figure 7. Cosine similarities between pairs of gradient updates in the same round.](image)
E. Potential Negative Societal Impacts and Mitigations

In this paper, we introduce an attack that might bring negative impacts on society. For example, if an attacker implants the backdoor attack into a public next-word prediction model trained through federated learning, the model might be able to predict some inappropriate words after certain trigger sentences. This decreases the reliability of federated learning.

However, on the other hand, we unveil this attack to the public for the attention of the community, bringing to the community’s attention that basing their estimation of attack capabilities on the the attack suggested in Bagdasaryan et al. (2019) underestimates the potential validity of such an attack. Although norm-bounding is a strong and efficient defense in (Sun et al., 2019b), the proposed attack still works with a tight norm-bounding. This shows that additional defenses should be considered on top of norm-bounding, which continues to be a necessary defense to mitigate individual influence of an attack that sends extreme malicious updates, like model replacement (Bagdasaryan et al., 2019; Bhagoji et al., 2019). According to Appendix D, the cosine similarity between the benign users’ updates and the update of our proposed attack is very small, so Krum (Blanchard et al., 2017) could be a possible defense, where Krum filters out outlier updates. Moreover, in Appendix C, the most straightforward defense could be increasing the number of participants per round during the training. By doing so, the server can also expect the higher main task accuracy (Wang et al., 2021).